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THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS OF 1856
HAROLD S. IRWIN*
The Act of April 22, 1856,1 which is still in force, reads, "No right of
entry shall accrue, or action be maintained for a specific performance of any
contract for the sale of any real estate, or for damages for noncompliance
with any such contract, or to enforce any equity of redemption, after re-entry
made for any condition broken, or to enforce any implied or resulting trust as
to realty, but within five years after such contract was made or such equity
or trust accrued, with the right of entry; unless such contract shall give a
longer time for its performance, or there has been, in part, a substantial per-
formance, or such contract, equity of redemption or trust, shall have been
acknowledged by writing to subsist, by the party to be charged therewith,
within the same period : Provided, That as to any one affected with a trust,
by reason of his fraud, the said limitation shall begin to run only from the dis-
covery thereof, or when, by reasonable diligence, the party defrauded might
have discovered the same; but no bona fide purchaser from him shall be af-
fected thereby, or deprived of the protection of the said limitation : And pro-
vided, That any person who would be sooner barred by this section shall not
be barred for two years from the date hereof."
This section was amended by the Act of March 27, 18652 by providing,
"So much of the sixth section of the act of April 22, 1856, as provides that.no
right of entry shall accrue, or action be maintained, to enforce any implied or
resulting trust as to realty, but within five years after such trust accrued, be
and the same is hereby repealed, so far as it relates to, or protects the title of,
any attorney at law, to any lands purchased, or held by him, of, or for, his
client, under, or subject to, such trusts.'"
Prior to the Act of April 22, 1856a an action to enforce an implied or re-
*Ph.B., Dickinson College, 1923; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law, 1925; M.A., Dickinson
College, 1925; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, 1925-; Faculty Editor, Dickin-
son Law Review; Member of Pennsylvania Bar.
'P. L. 532, section 6; 12 P. S. 83.
2P. L. 56, section 1.
3P. L. 532. section 6; 12 P. S. 83.
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sulting trust could be maintained within twenty-one years from the time the
trust arose,4 the Act of March 26, 1785" applying.
The statute applies, by its terms, to three distinct situations. It limits the
time for bringing (1) an action on a contract for the sale of realty, whether it
be an action for specific performance or an action for damages for nonperform-
ance and whether the action be at law or in equity, or in the Orphans' Court;
(2) an action to enforce the equity of redemption of a mortgagor after re-
entry has been made by the mortgagee for a condition broken by the mort-
gagor; (3) an action to enforce any implied or resulting trust as to realty.6
The statutory period within which the action must be commenced or the
right of entry exercised is five years.
The statute prescribes that no action shall be maintained " * * * *
but within five years after such contract was made or such equity or trust ac-
cured, with the right of entry * * * * ." Do the words "with the right of
entry" qualify the contract provision as well as the equity of redemption and
trust provisions? There is nothing in the language used or in the extra-
legislative punctuation thereof that makes this qualification apply to the latter
two situations only and not to the former. If it does apply to the contract
provision, the necessary deduction is that the statute was not meant to apply
to suits for specific performance or damages for nonperformance brought by
the vendor against the vendee. This must be true because the vendor norm-
ally retains possession until performance by the vendee and it would be sense-
less to talk of the owner in possession getting a right of entry by the contract
before the limitation started running. On the other hand the vendee does get
a right of entry by virtue of the contract that he did not have before the con-
tract was made. Such right of entry ordinarily would accrue on the date set
for completion of the contract, i. e. the date set for payment and transfer of
possession. If the "right of entry" provision does not apply to contracts for
the sale of realty, the limitation begins to run when the contract is made even
though the contract calls for performance a year later and there would be no
breach until a year later. Thus the limitation would start precluding an
action before any action could be instituted. Such can not be its meaning.
The conclusion that the statute does not apply to suits by the vendor against
the vendee is buttressed also by the general purpose of the statute. This is
#McBarron v. Glass, 30 Pa. 133 (1858).
52 Sm. L., 299, section 2.
aIn Kingston Trustees v. Kingston Coal Co., 265 Pa. 232 (1919) an action of waste was
held to be an action to enforce a trust where it was necessary in such action to establish such
a trust to sustain the action.
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clearly to protect the holder of the legal title to land against the dilatory asser-
tion of equities-by mortgagors, by beneficiaries in implied and constructive
trusts and by vendees. There are no authoritative decisions on this point but
our conclusion is that the section meant to include "with right of entry" in the
contract provision, that the limitation does not apply to suits by the vendor
against the vendee either for specific performance or for damages," . and that
the period begins to run, when, after the contract is made, there is a right of
entry in the vendee and the contract is breached by the vendor,
To this general rule for starting the five year period, the section adds a
qualification in the case of contracts, "unless such contract shall give a longer
time for its performance or there has been, in part, a substantial performance,
or such contract * * * * shall have been acknowledged by writing to
subsist, by the party to be charged therewith, within the same period."
What is meant by such contract giving a "longer time for its perform-
ance"? The only time mentioned in comparison with which another time
could be longer is the five year period. Hence the fact that the contract
gives a year for its performance, or two years, etc. is immaterial under this
exception unless the time is more than five years. As stated above, however,
such a shorter time being set in the contract for performance would be material
in determining when the period would start to run under the general rule of
the section. The section does not state when the period shall start if the con-
tract does give such a longer time for performance. In fact, a literal reading
of the statute would leave such a contract entirely outside of the limitation of
the section. No logical reason can be suggested why in such a contract the
five year period should not begin to run from such time set for its performance
and why an unlimited time, except as qualified by laches in the case of specific
performance or the general limitation on actions of assumpsit, should be per-
mitted in such a case. It is to be hoped that the section will be held applicable
from the time the contract was made with right of entry, thus making the ex-
ception of no importance as an exception.
What is meant by, in the case of contracts, "in part, a substantial per-
formance" ? By whom is the substantial performance to be given? Normally
the only substantial performance which could be given by the vendor would
be full performance, i. e., conveying the title to the vendee. Thus the section
6*But see Federal Realty Co. v. Bolland, 59 Pitts. L. J. 474 (1911) where the section was
applied to a suit by the vendor. The court shows no appreciation of the issue involved and
even omits the words "with the right of entry" from its quotation of the section. See also
Taylor's Adm'rs v. Witman's Adm'rs, 3 Grant 138 (1861) and Reed v. Reed, 46 Pa. 239
(1863). In McSorley v. Mamaux, 68 Pitts. L. J. 267 (1920) the act was not applied to a suit
by the vendor against the vendee.
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must mean that the performance is to be given by the vendee. This would be
true, certainly, if the section does not apply to suits by the vendor as argued
above. But why should substantial performance by the vendee make it un-
necessary for such vendee to sue within the reasonable time set by the statute
to compel the vendor to perform or to recompense the vendee for nonperform-
ance? The purpose may well be to protect the vendee against the loss and
inequity which would be suffered by him after he has substantially performed.
This loss would be considerably greater than when no such performance had
been made by him. Too, a vendor notified by the vendee's substantial per-
formance of the contract has ample warning of the claim of the vendee within
a seasonable time and the later assertion, by suit, of the claim of the vendee
can not be regarded as a stale one. How far must the vendee perform to
make his performance substantial? Does it require such performance as
would take the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds where the
contract is an oral one? Most Pennsylvania cases require noncompensable
improvements as well as possession and part payment by the vendee f6r this
latter purpose. Substantial performance of the contract should not require
improvements by the vendee, for, unless the contract calls for such improve-
ments by the vendee, (and such contracts usually do not so provide),
the absence of such improvements can hardly be called nonsubstantial per-
formance and their presence is not performance of the contract. Such con-
tracts ordinarily do not require the vendee to take possession of the property
but merely give him the right or privilege of so doing. Hence failure to take
possession can hardly be called nonsubstantial performance of the contract
and taking possession can not be said to be substantial performance. The
contract normally imposes on the vendee only the duty of payment of the
price. Hence payment of a substantial part of the purchase price called for
by the contract would seem to be the substantial performance contemplated by
the exception. 7 Mere payment of the "down money" would not be substan-
tial performance unless it was an unusually large portion of the purchase price.
It is to be remembered that such substantial performance must be made "with-
in the same period," i. e., within the five year period. By such payment or
tender of payment the vendor has seasonable notice of the intent of the ven-
dee to assert his claim. Then, as discussed above, the statutory period should
begin to run from the time of substantial performance (although the section
7But compare Kerlin v. Knipp, 50 Pitts. L. J. 420 (1903) where payment of the purchase
price in full in the form ofland was held not to be substantial performance. See Cumming's
Appeal, 4 Walker 251 (1881). If the contract be fully executed, the section is inapplicable.
Lulay v. Barnes, 172 Pa. 331 (1896).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
does not so state) or the period for suit would be controlled by the limitation
for actions of assumpsit or the doctrine of laches in equity. The problem of
the written acknowledgement exception is discussed hereafter in connection
with the trust situation, this exception being common to all three situations
affected by the section.
The fact situation controlled by that portion of the section dealing with
the equity of redemption rarely arises and any extended discussion of it is
therefore omitted. The only case of any importance dealing with this portion
of the. section is Harper's Appeal.8 This case concerned a conveyance and
repurchase agreement which was held by the court to create a mortgage. The
mortgagor was seeking to enforce his equity of redemption from the mortgage
more than five years after the making of the agreement. Possession had been
taken by the mortgagee (apparent grantee) at once on the making of the agree-
ment. Since the court held the transaction to be a mortgage it was not an at-
tempt to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale (resale) of
realty. It was decided also that the facts did not show a trust for none could
arise until the mortgagee had been repaid by the rents and profits and this
had not occurred. While the court conceded that the mortgagor was seeking
to enforce an equity of redemption, section six had no application to the usual
equity of redemption of a mortgagor for this limitation period applies only
where there has been a re-entry by the mortgagee for the breaking of a con-
dition by the mortgagor. Since the facts showed no such re-entry for this
cause, the section was inapplicable.
The statute sets a time limitation in the cases of implied and resulting.
trusts only and not for express trusts. The decisions have recognized two
distinct classes of trusts (in reality three)-(1 ) express trusts, (2) trusts aris-
ing by (a) implication or (b) construction of law.9 Express trusts are trusts
created by language of the parties sufficiently indicating an intention to create
a trust."0  Express trusts are not included in section six of the Act of 1856 and
the five year period of limitation has no application to such trusts,, The
equitable doctrine of laches will bar the enforcement of express trusts.12 The
implied or resulting trusts within the meaning of section six would seem to be
the same trusts that are excluded from the statute of frauds provisions of sec-
864 Pa. 315 (1870). See also Ballentine v. White, 77 Pa. 20 (1874).
9Jones v. Wadsworth, 11 Phila. 227 (1876); 65 C. J. 220; 26 R. C. L. 1170.
1OSmith's Estate. 144 Pa. 428 (1891).
"Kauffman v. Kauffman, 266 Pa. 270 (1920).
12Cohen v. De Cicce, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 51 (1927).
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tion four of the same act.' 3 Section four excepts, "where any conveyance
shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall
or may arise or result by implication or construction of law .... ..
Such trusts are those (1) implied by the law as a result of the acts of the par-
ties (other than language) showing an intent to create a trust, usually called
resulting trusts,'14 and (2) created by the law to protect the beneficial owner of
property from acts of fraud and are imposed regardless of the intent of the
parties. 15 The most commonly litigated instances of trusts implied by the law
(in fact the only cases arising under the act are of this type) are those where
the purchase price of land has been paid by one party and the title to the land
has been taken in the name of another party. It might be argued that the
section in including "implied or resulting" trusts meant to include only those
trusts implied to carry out the intention of the parties. The section, however,
discloses clearly that it includes also those trusts created by the law as a
remedy for or to prevent fraud by the proviso of the section dealing with
when the limitation shall begin to run. Cases are numerous in which the sec-
tion has been applied to such trusts ex maleficio. 16
The courts at first had some hesitancy in deciding the theory on which to
base the holding that the statute applied to trusts arising from fraucL by the
purchaser of property. Such was the case in Christy v. Sill." Here the pur-
chaser at a sheriff's sale prevented bidding on the sale of the realty in question
by various fraudulent devices. The court conceived that there was some
difficulty in holding the purchaser a trustee of the legal title for the seller since
the statute of 13th Elizabeth, part of our common law, held such conveyances
to be "utterly void" and hence no title passed of which he could be the trustee.
But the court conceded that he did take sufficient title to pass a valid one to
an innocent purchaser (which might be explained as a power to convey the
title of' the seller to an innocent purchaser) and also conceded that the de-
frauded party might ratify and confirm the conveyance without making a new
one. Another case, Pearsoll v. Chapins held that he was trustee of the land
13Act of April 22. 1856, P. L. 532, section 4. See dictum in Watson v. Watson, 198 Pa.
234 (1901).
"4Jones v. Wadsworth, 11 Phila. 227 (1876).
-Christy v. Sill. 95 Pa. 380 (1880). It is submitted that the trust provisions in section six
have nothing to do with the so-called trust arising out of contracts for the sale of realty. See
White v. Patterson, 139 Pa. 429 (1890). The contract situation is covered separately and
must be held to be covered exclusively therein.
'6See for examples, Inlow v. Christy, 187 Pa. 186 (1898) and Rice v. Braden, 243 Pa. 141
(1914).
1195 Pa. 380 (1880).
1'4 Pa. 9 (1862).
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in his manual possession but not of the title. In any event, the cases make
clear that the title of the purchaser will be an unimpeachable one under section
six if the action be not brought within the time limit there set. 9
In Tanney v. Tanney2° one tenant in common had purchased the land so
held at a sale for taxes. After more than five years the other tenant in com-
mon asserted his rights therein by action. The court held that the facts pre-
sented no implied or resulting trust under the Act of 1856 and that only
twenty-one years adverse possession would bar the other tenant.2"
Where the parties enter into an oral express agreement that one of them
shall pay the purchase price and that the legal title shall be taken in the name
of the other, the courts treat the trust as an implied trust arising from the acts
of the parties and not as an express one arising from the language of the
parties.2 2 While this conclusion has been reached in cases dealing with the
necessity of complying with the statute of frauds provisions of section four,
the same conclusion should be reached under section six dealing with the time
for suit, no compelling reason dictating an inconsistent holding. if the trust
so created is an implied one when the language of the agreement is oral
merely, it should be an implied one where the language is in written form and
signed by the party holding the title to the land, for the mere change in the
manner of recording the intent should not alter the nature of the trust.2 3
Hence even though the parties agree to the trust in a form complying with the
statute of frauds, the limitation period of five years would apply to such a trust
resulting from the payment of purchase price by one with the title taken in the
name of the other. The five year limitation period would apply to the other
types of resulting trusts in realty, such as where the disposition is in trust but
no trust is declared, although no cases of these other types have arisen under
the statute. The cases are uniform in Pennsylvania in holding that a mere
breach of an oral promise to hold in trust, as for example an oral promise to
purchase at a sheriff's sale and to hold the land in trust for the judgment debtor
and a later refusal to recognize the interest of such person, does not create a
trust ex maleficio and hence section six cannot apply to such facts.24 The
1oSee also Silliman v. Haas, 151 Pa. 52 (1892) and Frost v. Bush, 195 Pa. 544 (1900).
But see Dunn v. Truitt, 8 Phila. 27 (1871) where a creditor of a grantor who had conveyed
to defraud his creditors sought recovery in ejectment. the court holding the statute inapplicable.
20159 Pa. 277 (1893).
2lCompare also McCallion v. Broomall, 2 Del. Co. 320 (1885).
22Ott v. Duffy, 246 Pa. 211 (1914).
231d.
2*See, for example, Salsbury v. Black. 119 Pa 200 (1888).
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statute, by its terms, applies only to implied or resulting trusts of realty, and
has no application to such trusts of personal property. 25
In applying section six to actions for the sale of realty or to trusts, does
it forbid merely the bringing of an action or does the passing of the limitation
period also bar the assertion of the contract or trust as a defence? The
language of the section is, "No right of entry shall accrue, or action be main-
tained * * * * ." Clark v. Trindle26 says in regard to the right of en-
try, "Entry is regarded as a legal remedy, and under the doctrine of remedies
it is denominated remedy by act of the party." Hence the statute speaks
only in terms of barring the right to maintain a remedy, the one of entry by
act of the party and the other by act of the law. In Webster v. Webster27 the
defendant asserted a contract to purchase the realty as a defence in an action
of ejectment by the seller, the statutory period having elapsed. The decision
was based on the fact that the vendee had been in possession, the court ruling
that the statutory period did not run against one in possession. But the court
intimated that the statute did not bar the setting up of an equity by way of
defence as it would bar the enforcing Of it by action. Subsequent cases, how-
ever, are uniform in ruling that the statute has the effect of vesting an absolute
title in the trustee and that it does not merely affect the remedy.2 Chulek v.
U. S. Ins. Co.29 holds that the effect of the running of the limitation period is a
change of title to the insured property. Since title passes, entry and posses-
sion of the land taken after the limitation period has run would be the posses-
sion of a stranger to the title and have no effect on the disability to assert the
trust. 0
In the case of trusts, the period begins to run when the trust accrued,
with the right of entry. This must mean that it begins to run when the cestui
has a cause of action against the holder of the legal title. Resulting or con-
structive trusts are passive ones with the only duty of the trustee being to con-
vey the legal title to the cestui. Hence the cause of action is the fact situation
giving the cestui the right to maintain ejectment or a bill in equity to compel
a conveyance. This cause of action in the case of trusts resulting from pay-
ment of the purchase price by one and the title being taken in the name of the
25sChristian Brewing Co. v. Rusch, 272 Pa. 181 (1922).
2652 Pa. 492 (1866).
2753 Pa. 161 (1866).
28Townsend v. Roy, 9 Phila. 120 (1873); Way v. Hooton, 156 Pa. 8 (1893); First Pool
Gas Co. v. Wheeler Co., 301 Pa. 485 (1930); Buchner v. Buchner, 114 Pa. Super. Ct. 503
(1934).
2930 Pa. Super. Ct. 435 (1906).
3oTowisend v. Roy, 9 Phila. 120 (1873).
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other would arise normally at the time the legal title is placed in the one not
paying the consideration, the other having already paid the purchase money."1
Where the purchase money was paid by the holder of the legal title as a loan
to the other party, the cause of action would arise, i. e., the trust really accrue
on repayment or tender of the amount of the loan. In constructive trusts
arising from fraud or to prevent fraud, the trust would accrue when the legal
title vested in the holder thereof.3 The added clause, "with right of entry,"
would prevent the limitation period from starting in the case of remainder in-
terests until the death of the life tenant for until then the cestuis would have no
right to possession."
In the case of trusts arising from fraud, the section provides that the limi-
tation shall begin to run only from the time of discovery of the fraud or from
the time when, by reasonable diligence, the party defrauded might have dis-
covered the fraud. In so providing the statute is incorporating the usual
equitable rule in fraud cases. 4  Does recordation of a deed in form absolute
when it should be in trust give sufficient notice of the fraud to start the limita-
tion period running? In Maul v. Rider 5 it was held that such recordation is
not a case of "when by reasonable diligence the party defrauded might have
discovered the same." Cases applying this clause of the section are numer-
ous. 6
Another method of barring the action of the cestui by the terms of the
section is the sale of the land by the trustee ex maleficio to a bona fide pur-
chaser. It reads, "but no bona fide purchaser from him shall be affected there-
by or deprived of the protection of the said limitation." "Thereby" as used in
this clause must mean the fraud or the trust arising from the fraud. The add-
ed language "or deprived of the benefit of the said limitation" seems surplus-
age and adds nothing to the meaning of the words immediately preceding
them. Certainly the grantee of the trustee after the limitation has run would
be protected whether a bona fide purchaser or not since the title of the trustee
becomes unimpeachable even in the trustee's hands.
The statute is silent on the effect of a sale by a trustee under a purchase
3'See Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. 279 (1870).
3 2Bell v. Parrell, 5 D. & C. 387 (1924). Compare Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. 432 (1870).
-SPreston v. Preston, 202 Pa. 515 (1902); Peters v. Kerper, 5 W. N. C. 523 (1878).
34Dorr v. Leippe. 286 Pa. 17 (1926).
3559 Pa. 167 (1869). See also Madole v. Miller, 276 Pa. 131 (1923).
strider v. Maul. 70 Pa. 15 (1871); McKean Co. v. Clay. 149 Pa. 277 (1892); Olinger v.
Shultz, 183 Pa. 469 (1898); Inlow v. Christy, 187 Pa. 186 (1898); Frost v. Bush, 195 Pa. 544
(1900). See Orr v. Orr, 22 Dist. Repts. 887 (1913) applying this exception to a purchase
money trust case.
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money trust to a bona fide purchaser. This situation is now covered by the
Act of June 4, 1901 protecting a purchaser without notice from such legal
title holder. Hence such a sale would bar the action of the cestui in this type
of trust also.
The other exception in the statute which will prevent the running of the
limitation period reads, "or such contract, equity of redemption or trust, shall
have been acknowledged by writing to subsist, by the party to be charged
therewith, within the same period."
It is to be noted that the language does not say that the writing is to be
signed by the party but merely acknowledged by writing by the party. The
various statute of frauds provisions in Pennsylvania all require by specific
words a signed writing. It is of peculiar significance that section four of this
same statute in dealing with the proof of the existence of express trusts re-
quires a writing signed by the party holding the title to the land. The omis-
sion of this requirement of signing in section six would seem to have been de-
liberate and intentional and that an acknowledgment of the subsistence of the
trust in the writing of the party charged therewith, even though unsigned by
him, should be sufficient to toll the limitation. The issue here presented has
not been raised in the decisions. The only decisions dealing with acknowl-
edgment in writing take it for granted that the signature is required, each case
having such signature present. It seems likely, although illogical, that the
signature will be required by judicial construction of the legislative intent.3s
The acknowledgment in writing is to be made by the party to be charged
with the contract, equity of redemption or trust. If the conclusion reached
above is correct that the section does not apply to suits by the vendor against
the vendee, then the party to be charged with the contract will be the defend-
ant in the action-the vendor. Acknowledgment by the vendee would be im-
material in its effect on the limitation. The party to be charged with the
equity of redemption after the mortgagee has re-entered would be the
mortgagee and the acknowledgment would have to be by him. The party to
be charged with the resulting or constructive trust would be the holder of the
legal title, the trustee. If the cestui be chargeable with any obligation, it
37P. L. 425, section 1. See also 37 Dickinson Law Review 282 (1933).
381n Buchner v. Buchner, 114 Pa. Super. Ct. 503 (1934) the court, by Stadtfeld, J. says.
"The authorities cited by the appellee simply support the proposition that the act makes void
any trust of this character and that no action shall be maintained to 'enforce any implied or
resulting trust as to realty' unless the same be in writing, 'signed by the party holding the
title' within the period of five years after such trust accrued with the right of entry." This
statement by the court is an obviously incorrect one and is a confusion of the terms of the
fourth section of the statute with those of the sixth section.
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would be for the payment of the purchase price, reimbursement for expenses
and the like and he would not be chargeable with the trust.
Must the written acknowledgment be delivered to the party who becomes
the plaintiff in the action? The section does not so require in language. All
it requires is the mere making of the written acknowledgment. If made and
retained by the maker it should be effective to toll the limitation.39 Its pro-
duction might be required by using the act of February 27. 179840 or proved
by secondary evidence after notice to produce followed by failure so to do.
The written acknowledgment must be made "within the same period."
The same period means within five years of the accrual of -the trust or equity
of redemption or the making of the contract, with right of entry. Suppose
the party to be charged with the trust acknowledge that the trust exists after
the lapse of six years or ten years. Why should the trustee not be bound to
perform if he acknowledges the trust after ten years? The statute in effect
says that a written acknowledgment will toll the running of the statutory
period and is silent on the subject of what is necessary to lift the bar of the
statute once it has run to vest title in the trustee free of the trust. After such
title has vested by the running of the limitation period, it should require some
action by the former trustee, now the absolute owner, sufficient to transfer
title, legal or equitable, to the erstwhile cestui as if such former trust had not
existed. The statute being silent on the subject the ordinary rules of law ap-
plicable to situations where legal title has vested in one by the running of a
statute of limitations should control. A mere acknowledgment, even though in
writing and signed by the owner of the land formerly charged with the trust,
if insufficient to act as a transfer of an interest in land would be of no effect,
except possibly as a basis for an estopel. Hence a written, signed state-
ment, "I hereby acknowledge that I was trustee of Blackacre for X in 1930"
would be insufficient to create an enforceable trust. Just as clearly a mere
acknowledgment that X had paid the purchase money or that Trustee had de-
frauded X should be insufficient. To this effect is Buchner v. Buchner4 recently
decided by the Superior Court and the decision is in no sense a strained or un-
natural interpretation of the statute. In reality the statute does not apply to
the situation since it deals only with the tolling of the statutory period of limi-
tation and makes no provisions, negative or otherwise, for the situation after
39Cohen v. De Cicco. 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 51 (1927); Arthurs v. Weisley, 3 Penny. 29
(1882).
403 Sm. L. 303.
"1114 Pa. Super. Ct. 503 (1934).
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the title has become free of the equity by the running of the period of limita-
tion.
The Buchner case declares that the written paper signed by the party
charged with a trust in an earlier Supreme Court case, Lee v. Hamilton-2 "was
mferely an acknowledgment that the alleged cestui que trust had paid part of
the purchase money." In making this statement the court has fallen into error
for the paper reads, "I * * * admit and declare that said premises
were so conveyed to me and that I now hold one undivided third part of the
same in trust only for the sole use and benefit of Charles Lee, his heirs and as-
signs * * * ." The court in the Lee case caid, "The paper can not
be regarded as a valid declaration of an existing trust that had been created
by the parties in July, 1882, for such a declaration, made in November, 1887-
more than five years afterwards-would be of no validity under the Act of
April 22, 1856, P. L. 532; but in November, 1887, the appellant, as the sole and
absolute owner of the property, was competent to create and declare a trust in
it for her brother, and she did so for a valuable consideration moving (to)
her." The Superior Court seemed to feel that their holding was in some
fashion inconsistent with this Supreme Court case, saying that this case "must
not be extended further than is necessary." The case needs neither extension
to fit the Buchner case nor distinction from it but is an exact precedent for the
holding of the Superior Court. The other case on point is Strickler v.
Scheible, 3 a lower court case decided before the Lee case. In many points it
is in direct conflict with the Buchner case but it is now of no controlling force.
The cases are in direct conflict on the matter of consideration. The Strickler
case says that the former trust being wiped out by the limitation running left
no obligation sufficient to act as consideration and that a moral obligation is
not sufficient in equity, in any event. The Buchner case, now controlling,
finds consideration in the former payment of part of the purchase money and
holds such past consideration to be sufficient to support the express trust. The
court thus leaves untouched the question, still an open one in Pennsylvania,
of whether a consideration is necessary to support a declaration of trust by
the holder of the legal title.44
The acknowledgment within five years may be in the form of a deed even
though the deed does not refer to the trust and names a consideration different
42218 Pa. 468 (1907).
'329 Co. Ct. Rep. 308 (1903).
"4See Morrison v. Beirer, 2 W. 6 S. 81 (1841) which indicates that consideration is neces-
sary. Compare Dennison v. Goehring. 7 Pa. 175 (1847) and Girard Trust Co. v. Mellor, I
Dist. Repts. 182 (1892).
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from that on which the trust was founded, if the deed is ineffective as a con-
veyance to the cestui, at least as between husband and wife.4 In Smith's
Estate" it was held that the acknowledgment need not meet the requirements
of the proof of formation of an express trust. Here a letter acknowledging
the existence of a trust in "Sunny Slope" was held to be sufficient and that it
could be supplemented by oral evidence-to identify the property if necessary.
The acknowledgment could take the form of a will and the revocability of the
paper as a will would not affect its sufficiency under the limitation statute.4
7
Does the exception in the statute. "unless such contract shall give a longer
time for its performance" apply to the trust situation? The obvious answer is
that it does not. It is clearly a reference to the contract for the sale of realty
situation. No "such contract" is involved in the implied and resulting trust
situations, their basis being acts other than contracts. Notwithstanding this
seemingly inevitable conclusion, at least two cases suggest, while resting their
decisions on other and more substantial grounds, that such exception does
apply in the case of trusts.48
Are there any implied exemptions from the operation of the statute not
found therein in words? Will the limitation run if the cestui of the trust is
a minor, non compos mentis, feme covert or imprisoned?
The first case in which the issue was presented was Miller v. FranciscusA.9
In this case the cestui was a married woman when the resulting trust arose.
The court held that the general provisions in section one of the Act of 1856
applied to suits under section six and that since the action was brought within
thirty years from the time the cause of action arose it had been brought in time
although it otherwise would have been barred under section six.
The next case raising the point was War/ield v. Fox.so The point was
raised under section seven of the statute dealing with decedents' estates but
the court held that both sections were alike in re disabilities of the person
suing. The rule was laid down that a saving from the operation of statutes
for disabilities must be expressed or it does not exist. Since none was ex-
pressed in either section six or seven, no such exemption existed. It over-
ruled the Miller case. The cases since the Warfield case have been uniform in
45Hay v. Martin, 2 Monaghan 526 (1888).
465 Lane. L. R. 153 (Alleg. Co. 1888).
"Cohen v. De Cicco, 90 Pa. Super. Ct. 51 (1927): Arthurs v. Weisley, 3 Penny. 29
(1882).
48Kauffman v. Kauffman, 266 Pa. 270 (1920) and Buchner v. Buchner, 114 Pa. Super. Ct.
503 (1934).
4940 Pa. 335 (1861).
-e53 Pa. 382 (1867).
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holding that the fact that the one having the cause of action is under a disabil-
ity is immaterial."
Would the fact that the cestui was the spouse of the trustee prevent the
limitation from running? There can be no doubt that the one spouse could
sue the other to enforce the trust. The Act of June 4, 1901, -2 specifically gives
that right in the case of resulting purchase money trusts. The Act of March
27, 1913"a gives either the right to sue the other spouse to protect or recover
separate property. This is ample authority for suits to enforce implied and
resulting trusts. Morrish v. Morrish-" says that the statute of limitations does
not affect the rights of one spouse as against the other, in that even though
suit might lie, the law should not encourage domestic strife and internal dis-
cord by requiring suit under the pain of the penalty of the statute of limita-
tions. The same effect can be reached in most cases by holding that the
possession of the wife is sufficient to prevent the running of the limitation and
most cases base their conclusion on this ground."
Will possession of the cestui at the inception of the trust prevent the lim-
itation from beginning to run and will possession taken after the inception but
within the five year period toll the running of the statute? The first dictum
was that possession was immaterial, the statute meaning to require written
evidence of the right of possession in addition to possession or a suit to pre-
vent the limitation barring the action. 56 But in Clark v. Trindle I this dictum
was disregarded and possession was held to prevent the statutory period from
starting to run where possession was coincident with the accrual of the trust
and to toll the statutory period if taken after the statute had started but within
the five year period. The cases so holding since this case are numerous.5 8
Must the possession to have this effect be exclusive or may it be concur-
rent with possession by the trustee or with a third person? McLaughlin v.
-1McCall v. Webb, 88 Pa. 150 (1879) and Hollinshead's Appeal, 103 Pa. 158 (1883).
52p. L. 425.
5sP. L. 14.
54262 Pa. 192 (1918).
--See Miller v. Baker, 166 Pa. 414 (1894).
SOMiller v. Franciscus, 40 Pa. 335 (1861).
5752 Pa. 492 (1866).
OsWilliard v. Wflliard, 56 Pa. 119 (1868); Barrett v. Bamber, 81 Pa. 247 (18 76 )-posses-
sion by agent of cestui collecting rents and paying to cestui; Black's Estate, 18 W. N. C. 455
(1886); Bunn's Estate, I Kulp 205 (1882); Webster v. Webster, 53 Pa. 161 (1866); Lally v.
Barr. 4 Lack. L. N. 279 (1898); Keck v. VanDyke, 292 Pa. 532 (1928). Quinn v. Gormley.
302 Pa. 360 (1931): Skarupski v. Scelinski. 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 (1931).
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Fulton"0 held that the possession need not be exclusive of the trustee, the
cestui daughter living with her trustee father on the trust property. In other
cases the possession was held to be effective although not exclusive.6o Posses-
sion as tenant of the trustee or as agent for the trustee would be insufficient
as it gives no notice of a claim by the possessor in his own right.61 Posses-
sion might be constructive merely as where the cestui was given a share of the
rents collected from the trust property by the trustee.62
Will mere entry not followed by actual possession and occupancy toll the
running of the limitation? Douglass v. Lucas63 considered this problem. The
court held that mere entry would be insufficient to toll the running of the limi-
tation. It held also that mere temporary occupancy would not be sufficient
actual possession to have any effect. The court did not consider the Act of
April 13, 185964 which says, "No entry upon lands shall arrest the running of
the statute of limitations, unless an action of ejectment be commenced therefor
within one year thereafter; * * * * ." Clearly this statute applies to
the trust situation, It follows, then, that if mere entry be made within the five
year period, but is followed within one year by an action of ejectment, such
entry would toll the statute of limitations.
Would a tender back of the purchase price in a trust ex maleficio within
the five years arrest the statute? One case held, by dictum, but correctly, that
such would be of no avail.6
Must the defence of the bar of the statute be specially pleaded? Way v.
Hooton6 6 says that since it is a statute of repose it need not be specially plead-
ed. The statute was said to lay down a rule of evidence making conclusive
after five years that which was formerly prima facie only. A recent case 7 is
instructive on the pleading of the statute. The court held that the rule that a
statute of limitations must be pleaded as a defence and that such can not be
taken advantage of by demurrer or now by the affidavit of defence in lieu of
a demurrer does not apply to section six of the Act of 1856. Such rule ap-
plies where the statute affects the remedy merely and where a new promise
59104 Pa. 161 (1883). But compare Pfiffner's Appeal, 2 Monaghan 160 (1888) .where the
lower court said that possession had to be exclusive. The Supreme Court ignored this state-
ment and decided the case on other grounds.
6OMiller v. Baker, 160 Pa. 172 (1894); Orr v. Orr, 22 Dist. Repts. 887 (1913).
rlKonrad v. Nugent, 51 Pitts. L. J. 116 (1903).
62Jones v. Jones. 252 Pa. 553 (1916).
6-63 Pa. 9 (1870).
64p. L. 603, section 1.
65Huffnagle v. Blackburn, 137 Pa. 633 (1890).
66156 Pa. 8 (1893).
O7First Pool Gas Co. v. Wheeler Co., 301 Pa. 485 (1930).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
will revive the claim. The Act of 1856 is not such a statute and the rule does
not apply. There is no right of action unless it is asserted in accordance with
the statute. But the statute can not be raised for the first time on appeal.-
An amendment to an action brought within five years to enforce a trust
will not be permitted after the lapse of five years from the accrual of the trust
where the amendment seeks to include a second lot not included in the praecipe
and writ of the original action.6 9
The amendment to section six added by the Act of March 27, 186570 re-
pealing section six in re constructive trusts so far as it affects attornies at law
is self explanatory. The statute does not run in his favor. Would a bona
fide purchaser from the attorney get good title free of the trust? If the trust
be a constructive one, the answer would seem to be that the purchaser does
not get good title. The repeal would include the repeal of the provision of
that section protecting bona fide purchasers and the general recording acts
should not be applicable. This conclusion- seems to have been taken for
granted by the court in Barrett v. Bamber." But the Act of 1865 does not
apply to purchasers from the attorney trustee and the five year period would
begin when the purchase was complete.12 If the attorney were a purchase
money trustee the purchaser would be protected for the Act of 19013 protect-
ing purchasers without notice has no exception as to attornies at law.
68Lehman v. Lehman, 215 Pa. 344 (1906). If the defence of the statute is not raised, the
court will not raise it for the parties. Stewart's Estate, 278 Pa. 318 (1924) in which the
statute apparently was forgotten.
69Miller v. Bealor, 100 Pa. 583 (1882).
70p. L. 56, section 1.
7181 Pa. 247 (1876).
72Id.
72P. L. 425, section 1.
